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Abstract— The study aims to examine the relationship between 
shareholding ownership structures, national institutional factors 
and earnings quality of banks across MENA countries (Middle 
East and North Africa). Using four distinct earnings quality 
measures that detect different aspects of earnings properties on a 
sample of 158 banks (44 Islamic banks and 114 conventional 
banks), the study finds that all four measures of earnings quality 
are higher for listed and widely held banks; and, that state-owned 
banks have less persistent, less predictable, and less managed 
earnings. Moreover, Islamic banks in MENA countries appear to 
have significantly higher quality of earnings than their 
conventional counterparts in terms of earnings persistence, cash-
flows predictability and income smoothing using loan loss 
provisions. The study shows also that tighter supervision improves 
earnings reporting quality by reducing earnings management 
practices even in the presence of large shareholding.  
Keywords- ownership structure; bank regulation; earnings 
quality; earnings management; Islamic banks  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Financial reports constitute the primary information source 
for stakeholders of both banking and non-banking firms. 
Financial reports including balance sheet, income and cash flow 
statements provide information regarding bank performance, 
solvency and soundness. Hence, reporting financial accounting 
information need to be with high quality to insure reliability, 
accuracy and informativeness. Incomes represent the most 
important accounting information that investors, managers, 
directors and regulators rely on in their decision making 
process. Earnings are the primary information source for 
investors rather than any other performance indicators such as 
dividend and cash flows (Francis et al., 2004)[36]. 
Consequently, reporting quality of earnings is crucial for the 
well-functioning markets. Investors, analysts and policy makers 
require credible accounting information to assess the real firm’s 
economic performance and take subsequently optimal 
decisions. Penman and Zhang (2002) [57] consider that 
earnings with high quality if, before extraordinary items that are 
freely identified on the income statement, it is a good indicator 
of future earnings. Dechow et al. (2010) [26], further, indicate 
earnings with high quality if it provides more information about 
the features of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance that are relevant 
to a speciﬁc decision made by a speciﬁc decision-maker. More 
broadly, earnings reporting quality refers to the ability of 
accounting earnings to signal future firm’s earnings and cash 
flows (Francis et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007; Giao and Raposo, 
2011; Demerjian et al., 2012) [36, 21, 37 & 28]. Mainly, 
earnings are considered as high quality if they are predictable 
and easy to forecast. Yet, fraudulent reporting is absolutely low 
quality. Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) [44] examine earnings 
quality from two different perspectives: an informative and an 
opportunistic earnings management perspective. The 
informative perspective indicates that earnings quality is 
improved when managers report less noisy earnings by taking 
reporting actions that reveal accurate and precise information 
about firm’s real performance. However, earnings quality 
decreases if managers behave opportunistically and intervene 
deliberately in the earnings reporting process by altering the 
firm economic performance to mislead outsiders and/ or 
increase their own welfare at expense of investors. Thereby, 
earnings management has a lot in common with earnings 
quality. Highly managed earnings are definitely low quality. 
 
Literature on financial reporting quality and banking industry 
shows that banking institutions often manage their accounting 
earnings through the use of loan provisions or the security gains 
and losses for several motives: income smoothing, regulatory 
incentives, signaling purposes and tax payment (Beaver and 
Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007) [12, 
5 & 9]. Prior researches demonstrate that bank earnings 
management is a worldwide phenomenon (Shen and Chih, 
2005) [61] but its level depends on various internal and external 
factors. Banks risk level and governance mechanisms are the 
most widely analyzed (Cornett et al., 2009; Wan Mohammad et 
al., 2011; Abaoub et al., 2013) [24, 67 &1]. For instance, it is 
shown that bank executives’ compensation contracts increase 
managerial incentives to manage earnings (Uygur, 2013) [66]. 
However, the internal control systems increase accounting 
quality and limit discretionary behavior (Altamuro and Beatty, 
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2010) [7]. Further, Bouvatier et al. (2014) [16] indicate that 
European banks with higher level of ownership concentration 
display higher intensity of income smoothing through loan loss 
provisions (LLP). However, this negative association appears 
attenuated among countries with stronger supervisory regimes 
or higher external audit quality. Cross countries analyses such 
as Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) [35] and Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2014) [44] have highlighted the role of institutional 
environment and supervisory regimes in enhancing bank 
earnings quality by reducing earnings management. Auditing 
quality, changes in accounting standards and bank listing status 
are also revealed as important determinants of earnings 
management in the banking industry. This study aims to 
examine whether differences in ownership status could explain 
variations in the quality of bank earnings across MENA 
countries. Our research question is therefore: Is there a 
relationship between MENA bank ownership structure and the 
content information of earnings? We suppose that MENA 
region constitutes a favorable field of research for three key 
reasons: 
 
Firstly, MENA banking institutions are well characterized by 
highly concentrated ownership structure with the 
predominance of government ownership (Kobeissi and Sun, 
2010; Farazi et al., 2011). [47 & 34]. However the limited 
existing literature does not provide consistent findings on the 
implications of this distinctive ownership structure. There is 
no study in our knowledge examining MENA bank earnings 
reporting quality and its association with their ownership 
structures. 
 
Secondly and despite the noted higher ownership 
concentration that complicates the governance of banks, 
MENA legal institutions do not sufficiently protect minority 
shareholders’ interests against expropriation risk. MENA 
countries suffer from the weak enforcement of shareholders 
rights (Naciri, 2008) [56]. Nonetheless, several studies such 
as Caprio et al. (2007), Shehzad et al. (2010), Haw et al. 
(2010) and Busta et al. (2014) [19, 60, 39 & 18] prove that 
legal environment impacts significantly conflicts of interests 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
 
Finally, banking system in MENA region is characterized by 
the co-existence of Islamic banks and conventional banks 
side-by-side. Islamic banking assets1 in MENA countries are 
about 1,197.9 billion dollars in 2014, it accounts for more 
than 20 percent of banking system assets in 10 countries. 
MENA region constitutes so an adequate sample for a 
comparative analysis between the two groups of banks. 
The principal objectives of the present research study are 
therefore described as follows: Firstly, the analysis aims to 
assess the quality of bank’s reported earnings and measure the 
extent of bank earnings management in the MENA region. 
Secondly, we intend to determine whether and to what extent 
shareholding ownership concentration matters in bank earnings 
quality. Thirdly, the study tries to explore whether certain types 
                                                          
1 Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report, May 2015. 
of majority shareholder are particularly conductive to lower 
quality of earnings of MENA banks. Fourthly, the study will 
determine to what extent Islamic religious values affect 
earnings reporting quality. Lastly, we will highlight the impact 
of regulation and banking supervision in emerging economies 
on bank earnings quality. We employ four distinct earnings 
quality measures that detect different aspects of earnings 
properties (earnings persistence, ability to predict cash flows, 
income smoothing through loan loss provisions and small 
positive net incomes on a sample of 158 banks (44 Islamic 
banks and 114 conventional banks) from 15 MENA countries 
observed over the period (2000-2013). To control the MENA 
institutional environment and evaluate its role in enhancing the 
earnings reporting quality, we use three indicators: Investor 
Protection Index, Official Supervisory Power index, and Private 
Monitoring Index. Our empirical findings suggest that all four 
measures of earnings quality are higher for listed and widely 
held banks; and, that state-owned banks have less persistent, 
less predictable, and less managed earnings. The study shows 
also that tighter supervision improves earnings reporting quality 
by reducing earnings management practices even in the 
presence of large shareholding. Moreover, Islamic banks in 
MENA countries appear to have significantly higher quality of 
earnings than their conventional counterparts in terms of 
earnings persistence, cash flows predictability and income 
smoothing using loan loss provisions. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides 
a discussion on relevant literature and develops research 
hypotheses. Data and research design are explained in section 
3. Section 4 presents empirical findings. Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
A. Share ownership structure and bank earnings quality 
 
It is highly argued in the literature that corporate share 
ownership structure has a significant impact on the agency costs 
inherent in the stockholder-manager relationship, in the extent 
that it influences the efficiency of the implemented monitoring 
mechanisms. Both agency theory and empirical evidence 
suggest that owners’ ability and incentives to carry out 
monitoring effort and mitigate agency problems vary with the 
control ownership structure. Prior studies, for instance, show 
that single investors with small ownership stakes have little 
incentive to control the firms. However, blocked shareholders 
with large ownership stakes gain control power and have more 
incentive to monitor management activity (Schleifer and 
Vichny, 1986) [63]. Additionally, managerial ownership is 
deemed as relatively useful in aligning management and 
shareholders’ interests and reducing hence agency conflicts 
(Morck et al., 1988) [55].  Two competing views have been 
suggested by the literature regarding ownership concentration 
and earnings reporting quality association. On the one hand, 
      
 
 
ownership concentration alleviates agency costs between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) [41 & 63].  In fact, being large 
owner with a considerable number of shares creates strong 
incentives and gives more power to oversee firm management 
and evaluate executives in order to assure that shareholders’ 
interests are protected.  
 
In addition, Demsetz and Lehen (1985) [29] deem that majority 
ownership is an effective mechanism to mitigate managerial 
expropriation. One form of this managerial expropriation is 
represented in the lower financial and accounting reporting 
quality. Thereby, carrying on control over firm management 
definitely includes control over accounting information and 
reporting policies; and this is in order to reduce the scope of 
managerial opportunism. Large block holders therefore can 
force managers to adequately report financial information. 
However, managers of firms with widely dispersed ownership 
are assumed as in a better position to adopt discretionary 
accounting practices that serve their self-interests. In 
consonance with the monitoring hypothesis, many of the 
previous empirical studies reveal that the concentration of 
ownership leads to better quality of accounting numbers. For 
example, Warfield et al. (1995) and Alves (2012) [69 & 8] find 
that ownership concentration enhances the quality of reporting 
earnings by reducing the levels of earnings management. 
Similarly, Dechow et al. (1996); Yeo et al. (2002) and Jung and 
Kwon (2002) [27, 70 & 42] point out that block holders of share 
improves the credibility, reliability and informativeness of 
financial information. On the other hand, block holder 
ownership can generate unluckily an entrenchment behavior 
against minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) [41 & 63]. When ownership control 
is high enough, largest shareholders have the incentive to 
expropriate small shareholders’ wealth. They might possibly 
put pressure on managers to engage in earnings management 
practices in order to expropriate firm resources at the expense 
of outside investors. In the East-Asian context, Fan and Wong 
(2002) [32] reveal that earnings informativeness, proxied by the 
accounting earnings-stock returns relationship, decreases with 
ownership concentration. The study shows that controlling 
owners report accounting information for self-interested 
purposes, causing hence the reported earnings to lose credibility 
to outside investors. In addition, Leuz et al. (2003) [50], in a 
sample of 8000 firms from 31 countries, indicate that managers 
and controlling shareholders can use their control over the firm 
to benefit themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. For 
NYSE firms, Zhong et al. (2007) [71] too reveal a positive 
association between block-holder ownership and discretionary 
accruals. Further, Kung et al. (2010) [48] find in the sample of 
listed Chinese companies a negative relationship between block 
ownership and earnings conservatism. Drawing on the above 
discussion and on the recent empirical evidence from the 
banking sector (Isenmila and Elijah, 2012; Tsai and Hsieh, 
2013; and Bouvatier et al., 2014) [40, 65 & 16] showing that 
banks with higher ownership concentration conduct more 
earnings management and income smoothing that lower the 
quality of earnings than banks with low ownership 
concentration; we postulate that:  
H1: Ownership concentration lowers earnings quality of 
MENA banks. 
 
Religious ethical values are deemed as one of the monitoring 
mechanisms considered in the literature in limiting 
opportunistic and unethical corporate behavior (Dyreng et al., 
2012) [31]. For instance, Kennedy and Lawton (1998) , Conroy 
and Emerson (2004) and Longenecker et al. (2004) [46, 23 & 
53] have emphasized the role of religion in constraining 
unethical practices in the business organizations. Lewis (2001) 
[52] argues that religion plays an important and constructive 
role in guiding and controlling human behavior, it provides 
values of truthfulness, honesty, morality, justice and 
accountability. Religious beliefs and codes are in fact the source 
of ethical and moral behavior. In that way, religious identity of 
the organization is appeared to mitigate opportunistic behavior 
among managers and enhance as a result financial information 
reliability and the integrity of the financial reporting process 
(Abdul Rahman, 2012) [3]. Prior studies such as McGuire et al. 
(2012) [54] assert that religion-influenced firms are less likely 
to engage in financial reporting irregularities. They find a 
negative association between religiosity and abnormal accruals. 
 
Earlier literature on Islamic finance and banking suggests that 
Islamic banking firms are subject to an additional layer of 
governance in the form of Shariah governance. Abdel Karim 
(1990) [2] argues that the Shariah Supervisory Board could be 
viewed as similar to the independent company auditors in 
limiting discretionary behavior. Further, Quttainah et al. (2013) 
[58] find that Islamic banks employ less earnings management 
than their conventional peers. In contrary to the above 
conclusions, other researches such as (Zoubi and El Ghazali, 
2007; Taktak et al., 2010; Ben Othman and Mersni, 2014) [72, 
64 & 13] indicate that earning management is not much 
different between Islamic and conventional banking 
institutions. We postulate therefore that:  
H2: Islamic banks display higher earnings quality than their 
conventional counterparts. 
 
Empirical research examining the role of government 
shareholding in financial reporting quality is scant and, to the 
extent available, it is inconclusive. Starting from the role of 
government ownership in the economic and financial sectors 
(social, political and agency views) diverse relationships are 
expected. Under the development or called also the social view 
of state ownership, government intervene in the financial 
markets to promote macroeconomic growth and cure market 
financial failures. Government is assumed as powerful and has 
incentives enough to safeguard stakeholders’ interests and 
improve consequently the general welfare. Government is 
accountable to the public to monitor public firms since the latter 
are authorized to use public funds. Then, monitoring state-
owned enterprises management and more specifically 
accounting information quality is deemed as crucial to avoid 
robbery and corruption. Thereby, state-owned companies have 
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to exhibit good financial reporting quality. Consistently with 
the development hypothesis, Abdul Rahman (2012) [3] find that 
Malaysian firms with high concentrated government ownership 
have higher accounting conservatism and lower degree of 
discretionary accruals. In the Chinese context moreover, Wang 
and Yung (2011) [68] note that Chinese state-owned firms have 
better accounting earnings quality (better accruals quality and 
lower levels of abnormal accruals) than privately owned firms. 
Similarly, Bo and Wu (2009) [15] find that level of income-
increasing earnings management is lower in state-owned firms 
than in privately-owned firms. Conversely, the political view of 
state ownership supposes that state-owned enterprises are 
created to satisfy personal and political objectives rather than to 
maximize social welfare. Shleifer (1998) [62] argues that state 
shareholding has detrimental effect on corporate performance. 
Government acquires ownership in highly sensitive sectors to 
ultimately serve its political agendas. Unlike the development 
theory of government shareholding, the political view assumes 
that politicians and bureaucrats are self-interested individuals 
and pursue their own personal objectives at the expense of the 
State (Sapienza, 2004) [59]. They often seek to stay in power 
and maintain the perquisites of their positions (Shleifer, 1998) 
[62]. Thereby, monitoring decisions or expropriating corporate 
resources for the benefit of supporters is mainly influenced by 
various political and individual concerns. For example, 
politicians mostly in developing countries abuse their power to 
transfer some corporate resources into the hands of their 
supporters (Kung et al, 2010) [48]. Furthermore and in order to 
gain public trust and support, executives in state-owned 
companies can manage financial reports to mask large losses. 
In China, Chen and Yuan (2004), Ding et al. (2007) and 
Aharony et al. (2010) [20, 30 & 4] find that government 
ownership is more associated with earnings management 
practices than private ownership.  
 
No consensus is provided in the banking literature about the 
impact of the largest owner identity in the financial reporting 
process. Bouvatier et al. (2014) [16] show that income 
smoothing via LLP is independent to whether the ultimate 
owner is an institution, a family or an industrial firm. Following 
Tsai and Hsieh (2013) [65] who suggest that large government 
shareholding in the bank may limit earnings increasing 
management, we postulate that:     
 H3: State ownership in MENA banks is associated with 
higher earnings quality. 
 
B. Bank earnings quality and the regulatory environment 
 
Prior literature on banking firms displays international 
differences in earnings quality, suggesting, therefore that the 
latter could be affected by differences in the institutional 
environment and banking regulation. Investor protection, 
regulation, supervision and financial development have shown 
                                                          
2 We refer to the World Bank Group Doing Business Reports to identify MENA countries 
(Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
great effect on earnings management and income smoothing 
behavior. Cross-countries studies such as Biurrun (2010) and 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) [14 & 44] indicate negative 
relationship between banking regulation and supervision, and 
earnings management. Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) [35] who 
find significant influence of investor protection and legal 
enforcement in reducing incentives to smooth income, argue 
that banks with higher incentives to shift risk in the event if 
bank run, have higher incentive too to manage earnings to hide 
their risk-shifting. Since efficient bank regulation and 
supervision proves to be in limiting bank risk, then it will prove 
to be in limiting income smoothing. In that way, bank regulators 
and supervisors who have greater power to reduce bank risk-
taking through monitoring and disciplining management will 
obviously reduce banks’ incentives to smooth earnings. Based 
on what precede, we suggest that banking regulation matters 
and works to constrain banks’ earnings management. We 
postulate therefore that: 
H4: Stronger bank regulation improves MENA bank 
earnings quality. 
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Description 
 
For the purpose of the current investigation, we build a 
multivariate database on banks’ individual ownership 
information, bank-specific variables and some country 
characteristics. We collect data of Islamic and conventional 
banks operating in 15 MENA countries2 namely (Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Oman, 
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen) 
during the period 2000 to 2013. We retrieve bank accounting 
data from BvD BankScope and macroeconomic data from the 
World Bank. For the time period covered by this study, we can 
collect full data for only 158 banks (see Table 1). The regression 
analyses are conducted by using STATA 11.1. 
 
B. Ownership Measures 
 
Bank ownership database is particularly difficult to 
construct. Initially, we rely on BankScope, Union of Arab 
Banks, Zonebourse, GulfBase and Zawya databases to define 
the ultimate bank owners. These sources provide information 
for only one year while we have to detect variation of ownership 
structure over the time period of this study (2000-2013). Hence, 
and to compile ownership data, we use earlier bank annual 
reports and/or national institutions publications such as central 
banks, stock exchange and ministries of finance. In order to 
fulfill the gaps in our database, we tape into the online archives 
of business magazines and pull up articles about previous bank 
merger and acquisition event3 that occurred in the MENA 
region during the period of the study. Collecting data on 
ownership constitutes a fundamental contribution of this 
and Yemen). Nonetheless, Algeria, Libya, Syria and Iraq are excluded from our sample due 
to missing data. 
3 About 6 bank mergers took place in our sample of country-years. 
      
 
 
research. We have hence four variables Widely: is a dummy 
variable that equals one if no legal entity owns 10 % or more of 
the voting rights, and zero otherwise. Control Right: equals the 
fraction of the direct and indirect bank’s voting rights, if any, 
owned by its controlling shareholder. Control Right equals zero 
if the bank is widely held. Cash Flow Right: equals the fraction 
of the bank's cash-flow rights owned directly and indirectly by 
its controlling shareholder. Cash Flow Right equals zero if the 
bank is widely held. State: is a dummy variable that equals one 
if the state (or a foreign state) is the controlling shareholder, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
 
TABLE 1:  DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS IN THE SAMPLE 
 
 Number of 
banks 
Number of 
listed 
banks 
Number of 
Islamic 
banks 
Bahrain 16 10 8 
Egypt 19 15 2 
Iran 8 0 8 
Jordan 12 11 3 
Kuwait 11 10 4 
Lebanon 19 5 0 
Malta 4 2 0 
Morocco 6 5 0 
Oman 7 5 0 
Palestine 2 1 1 
Qatar 9 8 3 
Saudi Arabia 6 5 4 
Tunisia 15 10 1 
UAE 20 17 7 
Yemen 4 0 3 
Total 158 104 44 
 
C. Regulatory Index 
 
To provide information on the legal environment quality, 
we use three indicators: 
 
 Strength of Investor Protection Index: obtained from 
the World Bank Doing Business database. It measures 
the strength of minority shareholder protections 
                                                          
4 The index is based on 9 answers to yes or no questions from the survey: 1. Are 
auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any 
presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, 
fraud, or insider abuse? 2. Does the banking supervisor have the right to meet 
with the external auditors and discuss their report without the approval of the 
bank? 3. In cases where the supervisor identifies that the bank has received an 
inadequate audit, does the supervisor have the powers to take actions against 
the external auditor? 4. Do banks disclose to the supervisor off-balance sheet 
items? 5. Does the supervisory agency require banks to constitute provisions to 
cover actual or potential losses? 6. Does the supervisory agency require banks 
to reduce or suspend dividends to shareholders? 7. Does the supervisory agency 
require banks to reduce or suspend bonuses and other remuneration to bank 
directors and managers? 8. Does the supervisory agency have the powers to 
perform the following problem bank resolution activities? a) Declare 
insolvency b) Supersede shareholders' rights c) Remove and replace bank senior 
management and directors. 9. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to 
change its internal organizational structure?  
Yes/No responses to the previous questions are coded as 1/0. 
Responses to questions 7, 8(b) and 8(c) are multiplied by 2.  
Index= 1+2+3+4+5+6+(7*2)+8(a)+(8(b)*2)+(8(c)*2)+9 
 
against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for 
personal gain. IPI ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating more investor protection.  
 
 Official Supervisory Power Index: drawn from the 
World Bank’s Regulation and Supervision databases 
Cihák et al. (2012) [22] (Survey IV). The index 
measures the degree of official supervisory power in a 
country. It indicates the extent to which supervisory 
authorities have the power to take prompt actions to 
prevent, correct problems, and restructure and 
reorganize troubled banks4. Higher values imply 
greater power.  
 
 Private Monitoring Index: drawn from Cihák et al. 
(2012) [22] (Survey IV), it covers audit requirements, 
the extent to which banks have to be rated by 
international and domestic rating agencies, and whether 
and to what degree depositors are protected by an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme5. Higher values 
imply more private oversight. 
 
D. Testing for Earnings Quality 
 
The principal objectives of the current study are to assess 
earnings quality of banks across MENA countries; and examine 
its relation between share ownership structures and national 
institutional factors. To successfully perform them, several 
traditional proxies of earnings quality are required. Dechow et 
al. (2010) [26] define three categories of earnings quality 
proxies, namely properties of earnings, investor responsiveness 
to earnings and external indicators of earnings misstatements. 
Consistently with the object aimed and because of limited data 
availability and accessibility, we decided hence to focus only 
on the earnings properties as an indicator of earnings quality. 
Ahrens (2010) [6] identifies three essential properties of 
earnings that should be verified to qualify earnings reporting as 
a good quality: current earnings should represent firm current 
5 The index is based on 12 answers to yes or no questions from the survey: 1. Is 
an audit by a professional external auditor required for all commercial banks in 
your jurisdiction? 2. Does the external auditor have to obtain a professional 
certification or pass a specific exam? 3. How many of the top ten banks (in 
terms of total domestic assets) are rated by domestic credit rating agencies? 4. 
How many of the top ten banks (in terms of total domestic assets) are rated by 
international credit rating agencies (e.g., Moody's, Standard and Poor)? 5. Does 
accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal enter the income statement while the 
loan is non-performing? 6. Does accrued, though unpaid, interest/principal 
enter the income statement while the loan is still performing? 7. Are bank 
directors legally liable if information disclosed is erroneous or misleading? 8. 
Do banks disclose to the public off-balance sheet items? 9. Do banks disclose 
to the supervisors governance and risk management framework? 10. Are bank 
regulators/supervisors required to make public formal enforcement actions, 
which include cease and desist orders and written agreements between a bank 
regulatory/supervisory body and a banking organization? 11. Is subordinated 
debt allowed as part of Tier 2 capital? 12. Is there an explicit deposit insurance 
protection scheme?  
Yes/No responses to the previous questions are coded as 1/0. For questions 3 
and 4: 100%=1; otherwise 0.   
Index=1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+10+11+12 
 
EJIF – European Journal of Islamic Finance   No 6, Feb (2017) 
 
http://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/EJIF                     ISSN 2421-2172  6 
 
performance, current earnings should be an indicator for future 
earnings, and finally current earnings should be free from 
earnings management. 
 
To better assess these properties, we resort henceforth to four 
widely used measures by the reputed literature Altamuro and 
Beatty (2010), Kanagaretnam et al. (2011, 2014) and Fang et al. 
(2014) [7, 43, 44 &33] namely earnings persistence, cash flows 
predictability, income smoothing through loan loss provisions, 
and small positive net income. 
 
a) Earnings Persistence (EQ1): is defined as the 
coefficient on last period earnings before taxes in a regression 
of current earnings before taxes on last earnings before taxes. A 
positive and significant coefficient α1 indicates earnings 
persistence. Higher coefficient implies more persistent earnings 
stream. 
i,j, t = i,j,t-1 variables of interest +     
control variables i,j,t-1 + e  
(1) 
 
i,j,t = Earnings before taxes of bank i in country j during year 
t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year (i.e. at year 
t-1).  e: Error term 
 
b) Cash-Flow Predictability (EQ2): measures earnings’ 
ability to predict current cash flows as the coefficient from a 
regression of current earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions on last period net income before taxes. A positive 
and significant coefficient signifies that earnings are able to 
predict future cash-flows. 
 
Pi,j,t = i,j,t-1 variables of interest + 
control variables i,j,t-1 + e          
(2) 
 
EBTPi,j,t = Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions of 
bank i in country j during year t scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year (i.e. at year t-1).  e: Error term 
 
c) Income Smoothing through Loan Loss Provisions 
(EQ3): measures whether bank managers use the LLP to 
smooth bank earnings. Consistent with Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2004), Taktak et al. (2010) and Bouvatier et al. (2014) [45, 64 
& 16], we use an equation that explicitly models the non-
discretionary portion of LLP which is expected to cover credit 
losses and exhibits a cyclical pattern. We use total loan (Loans), 
non-performing loans (NPL) and the GDP growth rate (GDP). 
The expected signs of the coefficients on these variables are as 
follows: an increase in total loans is likely to result in an 
increase in the LLP due to doubtful loans. An increase in 
nonperforming loans is likely to result in an increase in the 
provision for loan losses. Both total loans outstanding and non-
performing loans are proxies for the default risk of the bank. At 
macroeconomic level, negative relation of loan loss 
provisioning and GDP growth reflects higher riskiness of the 
credit portfolio when the business cycle goes down (Pro-
cyclical behavior). In order to capture the discretionary 
component of LLP, we use earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions scaled by total assets EBTP to test if banks use loan 
loss provisions to smooth their income; a positive relationship 
between EBTP and LLP would be consistent with the income 
smoothing hypothesis. Bank managers play down (exaggerate) 
LLP when earnings are expected to be low (high). Moreover, 
banks can use the LLP for capital management objective. Even 
its occurrence is limited to Basel 1 and in some extent Basel 2, 
banks could manipulate the provisions accounts to keep their 
capital ratio adequate. Negative relationship between equity to 
total assets ratio (Equity) and LLP validates capital 
management hypothesis. 
LLPi,j,t = LLPi,j,t-1 + EBTP i,j,t + EBTP*variables of 
interest + Equity i,j,t + Loans i,j,t + NPL i,j,t + 
GDP j,t + e                                            
(3) 
 
d) Small Positive Net Income (EQ4): Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) and Hamdi 
and Zarai (2012) [17, 51 & 38] use the frequency of the small 
positive net income as a metric of managing towards positive 
earnings. Managers in fact make every possible effort to report 
small positive net income rather than negative net income (loss 
avoidance). SPOS equals 1 if net income deflated by lagged 
total assets is between 0 and 0.25% for each given year and 0 
otherwise. After estimating the dichotomous variable, we 
introduce it as the dependent variable in the following logit 
regression model: 
Logit (SPOS i,j,t) = 0 +1variables of interest + 2EBT i,j,t 
+3size i,j,t + 4Loans i,j,t + 5Equity i,j,t + 
6Listed +  7Islamic +  8GDP j,t +e         
(4)
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
To start our analyses, we report first in Table 2 descriptive 
statistics of both bank characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables used for the different models of earnings quality and 
collected for 158 banks operating in 15 MENA countries during 
2000-2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
TABLE 2:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF BANK–SPECIFIC 
VARIABLES 
 
 
Num 
of obs 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
EBT 1752 0.0193 0.0323 -0.2530 0.4752 
EBTP 1751 0.0222 0.1475 -6.0153 0.4752 
Income 1756 0.0170 0.0311 -0.2530 0.4752 
LLP 1755 0.0038 0.1157 -0.0564 0.3862 
NPL 1231 0.2332 3.0225 0.000036 0.8455 
Size 1917 7.9291 1.5533 3.6467 11.7104 
Equity 1917 0.1541 0.1444 0.000047 0.9944 
Loans 1915 0.5304 0.2815 0.0059 0.9934 
Deposits 1879 0.6675 0.3776 0.0020 0.9426 
GDP 1901 0.0501 0.0401 -0.1508 0.2617 
Note: Definitions of variables are as follows: EBT is earnings before 
taxes of bank i during year t deflated by lagged total assets; 
EBTP is earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions of bank 
i during year t deflated by lagged total assets; Income is the net 
income of bank i during year t deflated by lagged total assets; 
LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets of bank i 
during year t; NPL is the non-performing loans to total assets 
ratio of bank i during year t; Size is the log of total assets; 
Equity is the ratio of bank equity to total assets of bank i during 
year t; Loans is the total loan to total assets ratio of bank i 
during year t; Deposits is deposits to total assets ratio of bank 
i during year t; GDP is the GDP growth rate of country j during 
year t.  
 
 
Because of the unavailability of some bank-level variables for 
some countries such as (non-performing loans for Tunisia and 
Iran); and the use of one-year lagged values for other bank 
characteristics variables, sample distributions as noted in Tables 
3 and 4 differ between the four measures of earnings quality. The 
samples for earnings persistence (EQ1) and cash-flow 
predictability (EQ2) tests are relatively smaller than the sample 
for small positive net income test (EQ4) because of the use of 
lagged values. The sample for income smoothing test (EQ3) is 
the smallest one due to the more data requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF BANK-YEAR OBSERVATIONS BY 
YEAR 
 
 EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 
2001 _ _ 60 110 
2002 109 108 61 111 
2003 110 110 66 119 
2004 117 117 69 131 
2005 128 128 71 132 
2006 134 134 79 142 
2007 142 142 84 147 
2008 144 144 96 151 
2009 149 149 108 156 
2010 154 154 117 154 
2011 151 151 117 154 
2012 143 143 115 146 
2013 85 85 71 103 
Total 1566 1565 1114 1756 
 
 
Regarding the regulatory environment, the Investor Protection 
Index (IPI) has a median of 4.3 and ranges from 2.7 (for 
Morocco during the period 2006-2010) to 6.7 (for Saudi Arabia 
during the period 2009-2013). Official Supervisory Power 
ranges for our sample from 6 (Morocco) to 14 (Jordan). Private 
Monitoring Index ranges from 6 (Yemen) to 10 (Bahrain). We 
note a little difference between MENA countries regarding the 
investors’ legal protection and banking regulation; both are 
high on average.  
 
 
TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF BANK-YEAR OBSERVATIONS BY 
COUNTRY 
 
 EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 
Bahrain 155 155 117 173 
Egypt 215 214 63 234 
Iran 77 77 8 89 
Jordan 131 131 122 145 
Kuwait 98 98 95 120 
Lebanon 202 202 193 225 
Malta 34 34 35 41 
Morocco 53 53 30 59 
Oman 70 70 77 83 
Palestine 20 20 6 22 
Qatar 92 92 100 101 
Saudi Arabia 51 51 48 57 
Tunisia 130 130 7 145 
UAE 201 201 192 221 
Yemen 37 37 21 41 
Total 1566 1565 1114 1756 
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To conduct our research, we opt to split the full sample into two 
subgroups (high and low) based on the cross-country median 
values (above-median and below-median) of each variable 
(Investor Protection Index, Official Supervisory Power and 
Private Monitoring Index) 
 
 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Earnings Persistence And Cash Flow Predictability 
 
To obtain full insight on MENA banks’ earnings streams, 
we firstly employ two related but distinct measures of earnings 
quality: namely, persistence of earnings and cash flows 
predictability (ability of current earnings to predict future cash 
flows). Tables (6 and 7) report regressions results for those two 
measures. Following previous research on bank earnings 
quality Altamuro and Beatty (2010), Kanagaretnam et al. (2011, 
2014) and Fang et al. (2014) [7, 43, 44 & 33], we use as control 
variables bank specific characteristics (size, leverage, deposits 
and loans) and country level variable (GDP growth). Time and 
country effects are also included in the models. Regarding the 
estimation method, we use OLS regression with clustered 
robust errors to account for serial and cross sectional 
correlations in the residuals Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) [44].  
 
Our results show (from specification (a) to specification (j)) that 
current earnings before taxes is positively and significantly 
associated with past earnings (EBTt-1) at the 1% level (see Table 
6). For the second measure of earnings quality, specifications 
summarized in Table 7 display that bank current cash flows are 
positively and significantly associated with past earnings (EBTt-
1) at 1% and 5% level. These results indicate that MENA banks 
are characterized by persistent earnings able to predict future 
cash flows. Further analyses focusing on potential 
dissimilarities of earnings properties exhibit significant 
variations between different groups of banks depending on 
listing status and bank category. In fact, T-values of the 
interaction term (Islamic*EBT) show that Islamic banks tend to 
have more persistent (significant at 1% level) and more 
predictable earnings (significant at 5% level) than their 
conventional peers (see columns (e) and (f) in each Table 6 and 
7). Moreover, regression results show that (at 1% level of 
significance) listed banks maintain more persistent earnings 
stream than unlisted banks (see specifications c and d in Table 
6). This finding is fully consistent with the usefulness of 
earnings to equity investors; more persistent earnings would 
yield to higher equity valuations (Dechow et al., 2010) [26].   
 
Turning now to our main concern, all regression models that 
control for ownership concentration variables in Tables (6 and 
7) show negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
variable (control right*EBT). The estimations results reveal 
therefore that, at 1% level of significance, banks with higher 
ownership concentration exhibit lower quality of earnings (less 
persistent and less predictable). In order to compare between 
state-owned banks and private banks’ earnings quality, we 
include an interaction term (Control right*State*EBT) in the 
regression models. Columns (g) in Tables 6 and 7 show that 
state-owned banks have less persistent and less predictable 
earnings than their private counterparts (significant at 1% and 
10% level respectively). 
 
In the aim to examine the effect of banking regulation and 
supervision as an external governance mechanism on earnings 
quality; we include additional interaction variables (high 
ipi*EBT; high official*EBT; and high private*EBT). Columns 
(h, i and j) in Tables (6 and 7) show that banks in countries with 
higher private monitoring have more persistent earnings than 
banks in countries with lower private monitoring index; but 
banks in countries where the investor protection index is high 
disclose less persistent earnings. 
 
C. Income Smoothing Through Loan Loss Provisions  
 
Referring to Dechow et al. (2010) [26], persistence of 
earnings is dependent to a large extent on firm’s fundamental 
performance and accounting measurement system. Although 
separating the role of each is not so obvious, we aim to study to 
what extent the perceived earnings persistence is achieved by 
engaging in earnings management practices (Fang et al., 2014) 
[33]. Our third measure of earnings quality will subsequently 
focus on the accounting process; and try to capture earnings 
management using the largest accounting accrual for banks 
(Loan Loss Provisions). Earnings management is accordingly a 
specific dimension of earnings quality. In order to examine the 
determinants of loan loss provisioning practices for MENA 
banks and test the income smoothing and capital management 
hypotheses, we use Bouvatier et al. (2014)’s [16] regression 
model that allows for dynamic adjustments of loan loss 
provisions. We apply the Generalized-Method-of-Moments  
Country 
Investor 
Protection 
Index’s Mean 
Official 
Supervisory 
Power Index 
Private 
Monitoring 
Index 
Bahrain 4,7 11 10 
Egypt 3,55 11 7 
Iran 3,08 n.a n.a 
Jordan 3 14 8 
Kuwait 5 11 8 
Lebanon 5 7 7 
Malta 5,7 12 8 
Morocco 3,24 6 9 
Oman 5 13 7 
Palestine 5,3 9 8 
Qatar 4,3 9 7 
Saudi 
Arabia 
6,32 n.a n.a 
Tunisia 4,7 9 7 
UAE 4 9 7 
Yemen 4 12 6 
      
 
 
(GMM) estimators appropriate for dynamic models of panel 
data. The panel estimator controls for potential endogeneity 
using instruments applied to the lagged dependent variable. We 
present in Table 2 descriptive statistics of both bank 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables used for the 
income smoothing test. Across all sample countries, the mean 
of loan loss provisions is 0.38% and the mean of earnings before 
taxes and provisions is 2.22%. Regression results reported in 
Table 8 for specifications (a, b, c, e and f) show positive and 
significant (at 1 % level) coefficient on the earnings before 
taxes and loan loss provisions (EBTP). This finding indicates 
that banks in MENA countries use discretionary loan loss 
provisions to smooth their incomes, they play down 
(exaggerate) provisions when earnings are expected to be low 
(high). Further, equity to total assets ratio is found to have a 
negative and significant coefficient at 1% level in all 
specifications (Table 8), implying that MENA banks use loan 
loss provisions for capital management objective. These results 
are consistent with the majority of academic evidence 
pertaining that commercial banks in all over the world 
manipulate loan loss provisions for the purpose   of income 
smoothing and capital management (Anandarajan et al., 2007; 
Taktak et al., 2010; Ben Othman and Mersni, 2014; Curcio and 
Hasan, 2015) [9, 64, 13 & 25]. Regarding the non-discretionary 
component of loan loss provisions, data reveals that the lagged 
dependent variable (LLPt-1) is positively significant which 
indicates that banks dynamically adjust their provisions 
according to the credit risk level and macroeconomic conditions 
to cover future potential losses. Therewith the coefficient of 
non-performing loans capturing the credit risk is positive and 
significant. GDP growth coefficient is negative and significant 
at 1% level. Concerning the listing status of banks, specification 
(b) in Table 8 shows a negative and significant coefficient of 
the interaction term (Listed*EBTP) implying that listed banks 
use less loan loss provisions for income smoothing. 
Consequently, we deem that unlisted banks engage more 
aggressively in earnings management than listed banks. This 
finding contradicts the common opinion that publicly traded 
banks have more incentives for income smoothing to signal 
their private information about future bank prospects (Beatty et 
al., 2002; Anandarajan et al., 2007) [11 & 9]. A plausible 
explanation is that relatively to unlisted banks, listed banks in 
MENA countries are more monitored by regulators and official 
supervisions authority. Extensive supervision and scrutiny 
reduce thereby incentives to manage earnings and improve 
TABLE 6: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE EARNINGS PERSISTENCE TEST 
 
(EBT T ) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)    (G) (H) (I) (J) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.0113 
(-2.27)** 
-0.01 
(-1.95)* 
-0.0076 
(-1.53) 
-0.0082 
(-1.67)* 
-0.0118 
(-2.41)** 
-0.0107 
(-2.20)** 
-0.0117 
(-2.37)** 
-0.0090 
(-1.83)* 
-0.0095 
(-1.94)* 
-0.0094 
(-1.93)* 
EBT(T-1) 
0.5028 
(21.95)*** 
0.6066 
(23.49)*** 
0.3185 
(8.33)*** 
0.5026 
(8.96)*** 
0.2612 
(7.21)*** 
0.3833 
(7.65)*** 
0.5496 
(22.70)*** 
0.7216 
(11.87)*** 
0.6039 
(23.30)*** 
0.4761 
(10.76)*** 
CONTROL 
RIGHT*EBT 
 
-0.3733 
(-7.79)*** 
 
-0.2846 
(-4.57)*** 
 
-0.2158 
(-3.82)*** 
 
-0.4005 
(-8.07)*** 
-0.3920 
(-7.75)*** 
-0.2859 
(-5.34)*** 
CONTROL 
RIGHT * 
STATE*EBT 
      
-0.2609 
(-5.05)*** 
   
LISTED   
0.0004 
(0.28) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
      
LISTED*EBT   
0.2501 
(5.72)*** 
0.1075 
(1.93)* 
      
ISLAMIC     
-0.006 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.0038 
(-2.12)** 
    
ISLAMIC*EBT     
0.3625 
(8.45)*** 
0.2660 
(5.14)*** 
    
HIGH IPI *EBT        
-0.1183 
(-2.09)** 
  
HIGH 
OFFICIAL*EBT 
        
0.0548 
(1.16) 
 
HIGH 
PRIVATE*EBT 
         
0.1533 
(3.62)*** 
SIZE 
0.00035 
(0.71) 
0.0004 
(0.86) 
0.00006 
(0.13) 
0.00023 
(0.46) 
0.00073 
(1.50) 
0.0007 
(1.42) 
0.00052 
(1.05) 
0.0003 
(0.78) 
0.0004 
(0.88) 
0.0003 
(0.64) 
EQUITY 
0.0387 
(5.59)*** 
0.0379 
(5.60)*** 
0.0400 
(5.84)*** 
0.0386 
(5.69)*** 
0.0382 
(5.61)*** 
0.0370 
(5.47)*** 
0.0409 
(5.94)*** 
0.0375 
(5.54)*** 
0.0373 
(5.49)*** 
0.0368 
(5.45)*** 
DEPOSITS 
0.0042 
(2.38)** 
0.0038 
(2.23)** 
0.0037 
(2.11)** 
0.0036 
(2.10)** 
0.0045 
(2.63)*** 
0.0042 
(2.45)** 
0.0035 
(2.04)** 
0.0037 
(2.19)** 
0.0038 
(2.22)** 
0.0044 
(2.60)*** 
LOANS 
0.0039 
(1.67)* 
0.003 
(1.26) 
0.0026 
(1.10) 
0.0022 
(0.93) 
0.0052 
(2.23)** 
0.004 
(1.75)* 
0.0035 
(1.50) 
0.0029 
(1.25) 
0.0028 
(1.20) 
0.0037 
(1.61) 
GDP 
0.0653 
(3.82)*** 
0.0537 
(3.21)*** 
0.0607 
(3.59)*** 
0.0534 
(3.19)*** 
0.0670 
(4.00)*** 
0.0589 
(3.54)*** 
0.0614 
(3.63)*** 
0.0573 
(3.41)*** 
0.0547 
(3.26)*** 
0.0642 
(3.79)*** 
Num of banks 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 
Observations 1550 1534 1550 1534 1550 1534 1534 1534 1534 1534 
Adj.R² 0.3620 0.3855 0.3780 0.3872 0.3899 0.4034 0.3714 0.3868 0.3856 0.3904 
 
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level 
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earnings reporting quality (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008) [35]. 
Additional analyses show that Islamic banks exhibit less income 
smoothing behavior through loan loss provisions than 
conventional banks. T-value of the interaction term 
(Islamic*EBTP) is negative and significant at 1% level (see 
specification (c) in Table 8). This finding is inconsistent with 
Zoubi and El Ghazali (2007), Ben Othman and Mersni (2014) 
and Ashraf et al. (2015) [72, 13 & 10] but it converges with 
Taktak et al. (2010) and Quttainah et al. (2013) [64 & 58]. 
 
Focusing now on our main concern which is whether differences 
in ownership concentration explain differences in the level of 
earnings management, estimation (d) show that banks with 
higher concentrated ownership display higher degrees of 
income smoothing through loan loss provisions 
(EBTP*control). Going deeper in our research, we introduce in 
the regression model three dummy variables reflecting three 
groups of banks with different level of ownership concentration.  
Widely includes banks with no controlling owner; group 1 
includes banks in which the controlling shareholder holds  
 
between [10%, 25%] of the voting rights; group 2 includes 
banks in which the controlling owner holds between] 25%, 
50%] of the voting   right. We leave group 3, which includes 
banks in which the controlling shareholder holds more than 50% 
of the voting rights, to be the reference group. Similarly to 
Bouvatier et al. (2014)’s [16] findings, specification (f) in Table 
8 shows (at 1% level of significance) that banks without 
majority shareholder (widely) and banks with low and medium 
level of ownership concentration (groups 1 and 2) behave 
differently from banks with higher ownership concentration in 
the way they use loan loss provisions to smooth their incomes.  
These banks display a lower level of income smoothing 
behavior than banks with higher ownership concentration 
(group3). In particular, banks in group 3 display the income 
smoothing behavior previously observed for the overall sample 
with a coefficient (0.79) that is significant at 1% level.  
Due to their large shareholdings (more than 50% of control 
rights), controlling owner have higher incentives to engage in 
income smoothing practices. These findings support our 
TABLE 7: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE CASH-FLOW PREDICTABILITY TEST 
 
(EBTP T ) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.0569 
(-1.89)* 
-0.0553 
(-1.01) 
-0.0533 
(-0.98) 
-0.0544 
(-0.99) 
-0.0576 
(-1.04) 
-0.0566 
(-1.03) 
-0.0575 
(-1.05) 
-0.0543 
(-1.00) 
-0.0553 
(-1.01) 
-0.0552 
(-1.00) 
EBT (T-1) 
0.4109 
(2.99)*** 
0.5132 
(9.57)*** 
0.3045 
(2.48)** 
0.5289 
(4.85)** 
0.1907 
(2.29)** 
0.3277 
(3.62)*** 
0.4601 
(7.09)*** 
0.7130 
(5.02)*** 
0.5120 
(9.31)*** 
0.4110 
(5.81)*** 
CONTROL 
RIGHT*EBT 
 
-0.3671 
(-2.90)*** 
 
-0.3450 
(-2.92)*** 
 
-0.2375 
(-2.05)** 
 
-0.4143 
(-3.06)*** 
-0.3753 
(-3.31)*** 
-0.2986 
(-2.71)*** 
CONTROL 
RIGHT* 
STATE*EBT 
      
-0.2751 
(-1.95)* 
   
LISTED   
0.0105 
(1.08) 
0.0115 
(1.17) 
      
LISTED*EBT   
0.1162 
(0.64) 
-0.0615 
(-0.37) 
      
ISLAMIC     
-0.0035 
(-0.62) 
-0.0001 
(-0.16) 
    
ISLAMIC*EBT     
0.3272 
(2.62)** 
0.2174 
(1.59) 
    
HIGH IPI *EBT        
-0.2056 
(-1.29) 
  
HIGH 
OFFICIAL*EBT 
        
0.0243 
(0.19) 
 
HIGH 
PRIVATE*EBT 
         
0.1201 
(1.18) 
SIZE 
0.0061 
(2.03)** 
0.0061 
(1.04) 
0.0052 
(0.98) 
0.0054 
(1.01) 
0.0064 
(1.10) 
0.0064 
(1.09) 
0.0062 
(1.06) 
0.0061 
(1.03) 
0.0061 
(1.04) 
0.0060 
(1.02) 
EQUITY 
0.0928 
(2.23)** 
0.0927 
(2.17)** 
0.0954 
(2.21)** 
0.0948 
(2.17)** 
0.0915 
(2.22)** 
0.0910 
(2.19)** 
0.0959 
(2.21)** 
0.0920 
(2.16)** 
0.0925 
(2.17)** 
0.0919 
(2.12)** 
DEPOSITS 
0.0017 
(0.16) 
0.0014 
(0.46) 
0.0007 
(0.20) 
0.0007 
(0.20) 
0.0021 
(0.73) 
0.0018 
(0.62) 
0.0011 
(0.35) 
0.0013 
(0.41) 
0.0014 
(0.45) 
0.0019 
(0.59) 
LOANS 
0.0233 
(1.63) 
0.0225 
(1.28) 
0.0192 
(1.30) 
0.0189 
(1.27) 
0.0243 
(1.42) 
0.0233 
(1.36) 
0.0230 
(1.31) 
0.0224 
(1.28) 
0.0224 
(1.27) 
0.0231 
(1.32) 
GDP 
0.0541 
(0.53) 
0.0432 
(1.67)* 
0.0469 
(1.89)* 
0.0396 
(1.58) 
0.0553 
(2.17)** 
0.0471 
(1.87)* 
0.0506 
(1.91)* 
0.0494 
(1.74)* 
0.0436 
(1.70)* 
0.0514 
(2.03)** 
Num Of Banks 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 
Observations 1549 1533 1549 1533 1549 1533 1533 1533 1533 1533 
Adj.R² 0.0288 0.0293 0.0302 0.0302 0.03 0.03 0.0288 0.0295 0.0293 0.0295 
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
      
 
 
predictions on the effects of share ownership structures on 
income smoothing; that is higher ownership concentration 
lowers earnings quality by increasing income smoothing 
through loan loss provisions. Nonetheless, this relationship is 
reversed when the controlling owner is a state. Estimation (e) in 
Table 8 indicates that banks with higher state ownership display 
lower degrees of income smoothing through loan loss 
provisions. The T-value of the interaction term 
(Control*State*EBTP) is negative and significant at 1% level. 
Regarding the role of the regulatory environment (see Table 9), 
regression analyses reveal (at 1% level of significance) that 
banks in countries with stronger supervisory regimes  and higher 
private monitoring engage less in income smoothing practices 
through loan loss provisions. However, banks in countries 
where the investor protection index is high use more discretion 
in loan loss provisioning. These findings are in consistent with 
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), Biurrun (2010) and Bouvatier et 
al. (2014) [35, 14 & 16]. Tighter official supervision and greater 
private oversight improve earnings reporting quality by 
reducing earnings management practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Small Positive Net Income  
Since our main concern is to investigate ownership 
concentration effects on bank earnings quality, we test by a 
logistic regression whether the occurrence of small positive 
profits is associated with the existence of blocked shareholders 
with large ownership stakes. To be consistent with the literature 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Shen and Chih (2005), 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2011),  Leventis and Dimitropoulos 
(2012), Hamdi and Zarai (2012), Quttainah et al. (2013) and 
Fang et al. (2014) [17, 61, 43, 51, 38, 58 & 33 ]; we include 
along with our variable of interest (ownership concentration) 
bank specific variables (size, equity, EBT, loans, listed) and a 
set of yearly and country dummy variables in the logistic model.  
Initially, logistic regression’s results summarized in Table 10 do 
not find evidence that banks with higher control concentration 
are more likely to report small positive earnings (column a). 
However results reported in columns (b, c and d) show 
significant coefficient at 5% and 1% level with a positive sign  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE INCOME SMOOTHING TEST 
 
LLP T (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
LLP T-1 
0.1327 
(1.83)* 
0.1624 
(2.15)** 
0.1627 
(2.13)** 
0.1682 
(2.14)** 
0.1227 
(1.87)* 
0.1465 
(1.90)* 
EBTP 
0.7925 
(131.76)*** 
0.7974 
(126.76)*** 
0.7934 
(158.45)*** 
0.1093 
(1.11) 
0.7942 
(179.59)*** 
0.795 
(388.88)*** 
LISTED  
0.0278 
(8.75)*** 
    
LISTED*EBTP  
-0.7128 
(-12.24)*** 
    
ISLAMIC*EBTP   
-0.6264 
(-13.92)*** 
   
CONTROL*EBTP    
1.1241 
(6.98)*** 
  
CONTROL*STATE
*EBTP 
    
-0.8431 
(-5.33)*** 
 
WIDELY      
0.0184 
(2.50)** 
WIDELY*EBTP      
-0.7773 
(-13.60)*** 
GROUP 1      
0.0144 
(2.02)** 
GROUP 1*EBTP      
-0.6466 
(-10.12)*** 
GROUP 2      
0.0119 
(3.13)*** 
GROUP 2*EBTP      
-0.6169 
(-7.34)*** 
EQUITY 
-0.1216 
(-4.68)*** 
-0.0804 
(-2.57)** 
-0.1055 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.1042 
(-3.52)*** 
-0.1045 
(-4.27)*** 
-0.0984 
(-3.38)*** 
LOANS 
-0.0015 
(-1.24) 
-0.00005 
(-0.08) 
-0.00089 
(-0.79) 
0.00024 
(0.19) 
-0.0018 
(-1.53) 
-0.00024 
(-0.31) 
NPL 
0.0001 
(2.19)** 
0.0001 
(3.00)*** 
0.0001 
(2.41)** 
0.00008 
(2.07)** 
0.0001 
(3.12)*** 
0.00012 
(3.16)*** 
GDP 
-0.0373 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.0227 
(-3.01)*** 
-0.0231 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0251 
(-2.77)*** 
-0.0328 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.0254 
(-3.11)*** 
CONSTANT 
0.0053 
(1.74)* 
-0.0076 
(-1.63) 
0.0047 
(1.47) 
0.006 
(1.76)* 
0.0072 
(2.51)** 
0.0022 
(0.53) 
Number of  Banks 130 130 130 130 130 130 
Observations 1102 1102 1102 1093 1093 1099 
R² (Within) 0.99 0.9956 0.9912 0.99377 0.9918 0.9942 
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 9: INCOME SMOOTHING AND 
REGULATORY FACTORS 
 
INCOME 
SMOOTHING 
(EQ3) 
(G) (H) (I) 
LLP T-1 
0.1519 
(1.95)* 
0.1396 
(1.94)* 
0.1553 
(2.03)** 
EBTP 
0.5228 
(4.13)*** 
0.7960 
(362.23)*** 
0.7959 
(350.84)*** 
WIDELY 
0.0138 
(1.73)* 
0.0120 
(1.84)* 
0.0186 
(2.50)** 
WIDELY*EBTP 
-0.5693 
(-5.66)*** 
-0.5422 
(-7.46)*** 
-0.7649 
(-12.19)*** 
GROUP 1 
0.0151 
(2.06)** 
0.0101 
(1.53) 
0.0112 
(1.58) 
GROUP 1*EBTP 
-0.6011 
(-8.32)*** 
-0.4165 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.5126 
(-5.48)*** 
GROUP 2 
0.0125 
(3.18)*** 
0.0112 
(3.41)*** 
0.0095 
(2.55)** 
GROUP 2*EBTP 
-0.5865 
(-6.72)*** 
-0.5548 
(-6.27)*** 
-0.4896 
(-5.66)*** 
HIGH IPI*EBTP 
0.273 
(2.16)** 
  
HIGH 
OFFICIAL*EBTP 
 
-0.3095 
(-4.42)*** 
 
HIGH 
PRIVATE*EBTP 
  
-0.2737 
(-2.85)*** 
EQUITY 
-0.1015 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.0954 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.0955 
(-3.28)*** 
LOANS 
-0.0007 
(-0.80) 
-0.0005 
(-0.64) 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
NPL 
0.0001 
(3.98)*** 
0.0001 
(3.07)*** 
0.0001 
(3.08)*** 
GDP 
-0.035 
(-3.67)*** 
-0.0301 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.0254 
(-3.14)*** 
CONSTANT 
0.0025 
(0.61) 
0.0041 
(1.06) 
0.0030 
(0.76) 
Num Of Banks 130 130 130 
Observations 1090 1099 1099 
R² (Within) 0.9946 0.9944 0.9943 
* Significant at 10% level  
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
for the “cash flow rights” variable, indicating that the propensity 
of reporting small losses increases as the cash flow rights held 
by the controlling shareholders increases too. This finding 
suggests that, in case of financial difficulties largest shareholder 
owning more cash flow rights has more incentives to 
aggressively maintain positive earnings; because in case of loss 
he will bear high fraction proportional to his cash flow stakes. 
Largest owner hence will put pressure on bank managers to 
make all possible efforts to boost earnings and avoid losses. The 
logistic regression reveals in addition a significant negative 
relationship between earnings before taxes (EBT) and loss 
avoidance (column a, b and d), but no significant association 
with (EBTP) earnings before taxes and provisions (column c). 
This implies that banks are much more likely to report small net 
income in the interval ]0; 0.0025] when their earnings before 
taxes is decreasing. In addition, the insignificance of earnings 
before taxes and provisions (EBTP) indicates that bank 
managers are engaged in loss-avoidance management of 
earnings using extra techniques other than managing loan loss 
provisions. With regard to bank-level controls, our data prove 
evidence that highly leveraged banks and banks with higher 
loans are more associated with loss avoidance. High economic 
growth is negatively associated with the likelihood of small 
positive earnings. Intuitively, bank profits increase as the 
economy improves. State-owned banks are not associated with 
loss avoidance earnings management (estimation d). The 
negative coefficient on the dummy variable “listed” indicates 
that listed banks report less frequently small positive income to 
avoid losses than unlisted banks (results significant at 1% level). 
This is consistent with our previous finding concerning income 
smoothing using loan loss provisions (EQ3). Listed banks 
exhibit higher quality of earnings as opposed to the unlisted 
banks. Further results indicate that Islamic dummy variable is 
positively and significantly associated at 1% level with loss 
avoidance. Islamic banks report more frequently small positive 
earnings to avoid losses disclosure than their conventional 
peers. This result converges with Hamdi and Zarai (2012)[38] 
study showing that, in term of loss avoidance metrics, Islamic 
banks are more engaged in earnings management practices than 
conventional banks. Finally, estimation (f) shows that banks in 
countries with stronger supervisory regimes exhibit less loss 
avoidance than banks in countries with weaker supervision.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This study aims to examine the relationship between 
shareholding ownership structures, national institutional factors 
and earnings quality of banks across MENA countries.  We use 
a sample of 158 banks from 15 MENA countries observed over 
the period (2000-2013). We focus on the essential properties of 
earnings that should be verified to qualify earnings reporting as 
a good quality (earnings persistence, ability to predict cash 
flows, income smoothing through loan loss provisions and small 
positive net incomes). Those selected measures are supposed to 
be complementary and not repetitive. We conduct consequently 
four different regression models that control for the effect of 
ownership structure and regulatory regime on the banks’ 
earnings quality. Overall, our findings show that MENA 
banking institutions are characterized by high quality of 
earnings in term of persistence and ability to predict cash flows. 
However, they use loan loss provisioning to smooth incomes, 
and conduct loss avoidance earnings management. 
Concentrated ownership have large impacts on the content 
information of earnings. In effect, our empirical study reveals 
significant and negative impact of the majority ownership on 
banks’ earnings quality. Banks with controlling owner display 
less persistent and less predictable earnings than banks with 
widely held shares.  
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore,our data shows that closely held banks have more 
incentives to manage reported earnings in both forms (income 
smoothing and loss avoidance) than widely held banks. These 
findings are supporting the entrenchment hypothesis of 
ownership concentration. Controlling owners intervene in the 
earnings determination process in order to conceal from 
minority shareholders, debt-holders and regulators their abilities 
to extract private benefits of control. These results validate our 
first research hypothesis that is ownership concentration in the 
MENA banking sector lowers earnings quality. Concerning the 
state ownership, our analyses find evidence that state-owned 
banks have less persistent and less predictable earnings than 
their private counterparts. However, state-owned banks conduct 
less earnings management in term of loan loss provisions and 
loss avoidance. In comparison with conventional banks, Islamic 
banks have significantly higher earnings quality in term of 
earnings persistence, cash flows predictability and income 
smoothing using loan loss provisions. Nonetheless and 
consistently with the findings of Hamdi and Zarai (2012) [38],  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamic banks are more likely to manage earnings to avoid 
losses. These findings lead us to partially validate the third 
research hypothesis that is Islamic banks display higher earnings 
quality than their conventional counterparts. Lastly, our findings 
converge with those of Shen and Chih (2005), Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2008) and Biurrun (2010) [61, 35 & 14] regarding the 
role of banking regulation and supervision in improving the 
quality of earnings even in the presence of large shareholding. 
This validates our fourth research hypothesis. However, higher 
protection of minority shareholders proxied by the investor 
protection index does not appear as an efficient mechanism to 
reduce dominant owner opportunism. This research has 
emphasized the relative effectiveness of the bank governance 
mechanisms in MENA countries. The study reveals that legal 
shareholder protection as measured by the Investor Protection 
Index is insufficient to protect small bank shareholders interests 
from the discretionary behavior of the controlling shareholders. 
As well, we do not find evidence supporting the investor 
TABLE 10: LOGIT REGRESSION OF SMALL POSITIVE INCOME 
LOGIT (SPOS) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
CONTROL RIGHT 
0.370 
(0.87) 
      
CASH-FLOW RIGHT  
0.999 
(2.29)** 
0.894 
(2.12)** 
1.452 
(3.65)*** 
1.487 
(3.78)*** 
1.518 
(3.84)*** 
1.496 
(3.83)*** 
EBT 
-17.749 
(-4.60)*** 
-18.020 
(-4.66)*** 
 
-18.832 
(-5.30)*** 
-19.010 
(-5.36)** 
-17.816 
(-4.91)*** 
-19.564 
(-5.47)*** 
EBTP   
0.0153 
(0.03) 
    
STATE    
0.1478 
(0.65) 
   
HIGH IPI     
-0.070 
(-0.25) 
  
HIGH OFFICIAL      
-0.753 
(-2.49)** 
 
HIGH PRIVATE       
-0.370 
(-1.25) 
SIZE 
-0.058 
(-0.61) 
-0.073 
(-0.76) 
-0.1431 
(-1.49) 
-0.0367 
(-0.48) 
-0.025 
(-0.33) 
-0.016 
(-0.21) 
0.0163 
(0.20) 
LOANS 
0.758 
(2.47)** 
0.777 
(2.46)** 
0.697 
(2.20)** 
0.4675 
(1.43) 
0.484 
(1.53) 
0.507 
(1.69)* 
0.527 
(1.72)* 
EQUITY 
-4.009 
(-2.93)*** 
-4.138 
(-3.07)*** 
-5.167 
(-3.40)*** 
-5.206 
(-4.10)*** 
-5.076 
(-3.99)*** 
-5.313 
(-3.97)*** 
-4.923 
(-3.84)*** 
ISLAMIC 
0.851 
(2.60)*** 
1.010 
(2.97)*** 
1.017 
(3.09)*** 
0.670 
(2.81)*** 
0.656 
(2.68)*** 
0.993 
(3.73)*** 
0.812 
(3.10)*** 
LISTED 
-1.313 
(-4.48)*** 
-1.161 
(-4.06)*** 
-1.265 
(-4.54)*** 
-0.818 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.837 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.932 
(-3.59)*** 
-0.871 
(-3.38)*** 
GDP 
-7.100 
(-1.78)* 
-6.890 
(-1.72)* 
-9.237 
(-2.34)** 
-4.092 
(-1.28) 
-4.026 
(-1.24) 
-5.053 
(-1.55) 
-3.834 
(-1.19) 
INTERCEPT 
-4.320 
(-2.96)** 
-4.676 
(-3.22)*** 
-4.145 
(-2.90)*** 
-3.130 
(-3.85)*** 
-3.100 
(-3.48)*** 
-3.086 
(-3.76)*** 
-3.462 
(-4.14)*** 
Num Of Banks 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Observations 1719 1719 1718 1719 1719 1719 1719 
Log Likelihood -329.847 -327.515 -336.498 -342.695 -342.875 -339.527 -342.100 
Pseudo R² 0.1984 0.2040 0.1821 0.1672 0.1667 0.1748 0.1686 
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level 
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protection role in curtailing opportunistic earnings management 
for banking firms. We argue therefore that shareholder 
protection laws do not enhance bank governance of MENA 
counties. Regulators have to concern more about an effective 
enforcement of shareholders rights that would mitigate 
diversion behavior of dominant owners and reduce incentives 
for earnings management. Stronger protection of minority 
shareholders would limit the negative influence of insider 
shareholding.  
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